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Abstract
Background: Involuntary treatment is a key issue in healthcare ethics. In this study, ethical issues relating to
involuntary psychiatric treatment are investigated through interviews with Swedish psychiatrists.
Methods: In-depth interviews were conducted with eight Swedish psychiatrists, focusing on their experiences of
and views on compulsory treatment. In relation to this, issues about patient autonomy were also discussed. The
interviews were analysed using a descriptive qualitative approach.
Results: The answers focus on two main aspects of compulsory treatment. Firstly, deliberations about when and
why it was justifiable to make a decision on involuntary treatment in a specific case. Here the cons and pros of
ordering compulsory treatment were discussed, with particular emphasis on the consequences of providing
treatment vs. refraining from ordering treatment. Secondly, a number of issues relating to background factors
affecting decisions for or against involuntary treatment were also discussed. These included issues about the
Swedish Mental Care Act, healthcare organisation and the care environment.
Conclusions: Involuntary treatment was generally seen as an unwanted exception to standard care. The respondents’
judgments about involuntary treatment were typically in line with Swedish law on the subject. However, it was also
argued that the law leaves room for individual judgments when making decisions about involuntary treatment. Much
of the reasoning focused on the consequences of ordering involuntary treatment, where risk of harm to the
therapeutic alliance was weighed against the assumed good consequences of ensuring that patients received needed
treatment. Cases concerning suicidal patients and psychotic patients who did not realise their need for care were
typically held as paradigmatic examples of justified involuntary care. However, there was an ambivalence regarding the
issue of suicide as it was also argued that risk of suicide in itself might not be sufficient for justified involuntary care. It
was moreover argued that organisational factors sometimes led to decisions about compulsory treatment that could
have been avoided, given a more patient-oriented healthcare
organisation.
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Background
Whether it is justifiable to treat patients against their
will and, if so, when, is a central question in medical eth-
ics and law. Respect for autonomy is a central principle
in contemporary healthcare ethics [1]. A common asser-
tion is that respect for autonomy in healthcare implies,
at a minimum, that patients should not be coerced or
manipulated into treatment if they are capable of making
autonomous decisions about their care and treatment
[2]. In recent bioethical debate, the idea that autonomy
is something valuable that should be protected and pro-
moted has become influential [3]. The idea is of particu-
lar interest in the context of involuntary psychiatric
treatment, where it can be argued that involuntary treat-
ment could be justified in order to restore autonomy [4].
Laws on involuntary treatment in psychiatry typically
call for treatment of psychiatric disorders based on con-
cerns relating to the severity of the patient’s condition,
need for treatment, and danger to self or others [5–7].
Lack of decision-making capacity, which typically is
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defined in terms of abilities for understanding, appreciation,
reasoning and communication [8], is generally not held as a
necessary criterion for involuntary psychiatric treatment
[5–7]. However, studies have shown that also patients with
serious psychiatric disorders may have decision-making
capacity according to standard criteria [9–11].
In recent bioethical debate, current legal standards have
been criticised, and it has been argued that involuntary
treatment is only justified in cases where patients are in-
capable of autonomous decision-making [4, 12–14], and
primarily for the sake of their own needs, not for the sake
of protecting others from harm [2, 12–15]. There is also a
discussion on the use of advance directives in psychiatry
[16, 17]. However, there are controversial issues relating
to the extension of such directives, for instance whether
patients should have a right to reject future care [18, 19].
Empirical background
There is no conclusive data on the effectiveness of invol-
untary treatment with regard to treatment outcomes
[20–23]. Quantitative as well as qualitative studies on
patients’ attitudes to involuntary treatment report mixed
findings. Although many patients believe involuntary treat-
ment to be justified and necessary, follow-up studies sug-
gest that a substantial number of patients disapprove of
having been subjected to involuntary treatment, and nega-
tive experiences relating to restriction of freedom as well
as violations of personal integrity are reported [24–30]. It
is also important to note that formal legal status does not
always correspond to what patients experience as coercion;
hence patients may report being subjected to coercive
measures despite formally being under voluntary treatment
[24, 31, 32].
In a survey of American psychiatrists’ views about in-
voluntary treatment, respondents held danger to self or
others and grave disability as the primary reasons for in-
voluntary treatment [33]. Surveys of psychiatrists’ views
in Norway and Sweden have shown similar results [34,
35]. A recent qualitative study in a Norwegian setting
shows that considerations relating to beneficence and
protecting patients from harm were more important to
clinicians than considerations about patients’ ability to
make autonomous treatment decisions. The study also
argues that the clinicians’ decisions about involuntary
admission were influenced by extra-legal factors, such as
patients’ needs and attitudes toward treatment, expected
consequences of involuntary admission, the psychiatric
services’ follow-up routines, and the patients’ social cir-
cumstances [36].
The present study is a contribution to the discussion
about the ethics of involuntary treatment in psychiatry.
The article presents results from in-depth interviews
with eight Swedish psychiatrists, aiming to explore the
psychiatrists’ ethical reasoning regarding involuntary
psychiatric treatment. Additionally, the article discusses
the psychiatrists’ experiences and reasoning in relation to
contemporary bioethical discussion about involuntary
treatment in psychiatry.
The Swedish Mental Health Act
In Sweden, patients have a basic right to reject pro-
posed medical treatment and procedures. However, the
right to reject care can under certain conditions be
restricted, most importantly in cases of serious psychi-
atric disorder and in cases of certain infectious dis-
eases [37, 38].
The Swedish law on involuntary psychiatric treatment
specifies three necessary conditions for involuntary ad-
mission and treatment: (1) the patient has a serious psy-
chiatric disorder, (2) the patient has an imperative need
of psychiatric care, and (3) the patient refuses such care
or is deemed incapable of making a decision on the sub-
ject [38]. The preliminary decision about involuntary ad-
mission can be made by any licensed physician. The
decision, however, must be confirmed by a specialist in
psychiatry within 24 h of the patient’s admittance to a
psychiatric hospital. The decision is to be tried by a
court of law if the patient demands it, or if the involun-
tary treatment period lasts for over four weeks [38, 39].
When a patient is admitted involuntarily, he or she is
not allowed to leave the ward without permission from
the attending psychiatrist, and forced treatment (injec-
tions), seclusion from other patients, and physical
restraints (bed straps) can be ordered. In acute circum-
stances, decisions about forced treatment and restraints
(typically in cases of severe agitation) can be made dir-
ectly after the initial decision about involuntary admis-
sion. After a separate court decision, involuntary
treatment may be continued at an outpatient facility
after discharge from the hospital.
The notion of ‘serious psychiatric disorder’ typically
concerns psychotic disorders, severe depressions, or manic
states with psychotic symptoms. However, the law does
not specify which disorders could be included. Hence,
other psychiatric disorders, for instance severe depressions
or personality disorders could be labelled as a serious psy-
chiatric disorder if the symptoms are grave enough. More-
over, the law does not predicate any special kind of genesis
for a disorder to be labelled as psychiatric – it is the mani-
fest symptoms that count. The second criterion, ‘impera-
tive need of psychiatric care’, applies to situations where
grave consequences would follow for the patient (or in
certain cases third parties) if treatment were not given.
This refers not only to life-threatening situations or sit-
uations where there is risk of bodily harm to the patient
or to others but may also include other kinds of harms,
most importantly situations where the patient’s psychiatric
condition will deteriorate without proper treatment [39].
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However, the first criterion may be interpreted in the light
of the second criterion. Hence, if a patient has a psychi-
atric disorder and is assessed to have an imperative need
of inpatient psychiatric treatment, the patient’s disorder
would typically qualify as serious.
The third requirement says that in cases where a patient
fulfils the two first above-mentioned criteria but accepts
treatment, involuntary treatment can still be ordered if the
patient is deemed incapable of making a decision about
his or her care. However, lack of capacity is not a neces-
sary requirement for involuntary treatment and the notion
of decision-making capacity is not defined in Swedish
healthcare legislation.
With regard to somatic healthcare, there is no law per-
mitting involuntary admission or treatment except in
certain cases of infectious diseases [37]. Regulations
from the National Board of Health and Welfare require
assessment of decision-making capacity of patients who
wish to reject life-supporting treatments, but the extent
to which treatment can be given against the will of
patients who lack adequate capacity is unclear [40]. Psy-
chiatric patients with life-threatening somatic conditions
may, however, be treated involuntary for their medical
condition if the requirements regarding psychiatric in-
voluntary treatment are satisfied [39].
Methods
Respondents
The respondents were recruited continuously during the
project, with the aim of covering views and experiences
from psychiatrists with different backgrounds and expe-
riences (so-called purposive sampling) [41]. Participants
were identified because of their experience and expertise,
partly through previously established connections with
members of the research team and partly through chain
referral. All respondents were working in the Greater
Stockholm area at the time of the interview, but several
of them had previously worked in other parts of Sweden.
The respondents were 30–68 years of age. Five respon-
dents were specialists in general psychiatry, two were
also specialists in forensic psychiatry, and two were
working in addiction psychiatry. Three of the respon-
dents were residents in general psychiatry, in the middle
or at the end of their residencies. Four respondents were
female and four were male.
The initial request for participation was sent by e-mail
with information about the study, its purpose and
methods. Information was then repeated in written and
verbal form at the beginning of the interview. All re-
spondents were informed that participation was volun-
tary and could be withdrawn at any time without further
explanation. All respondents whom we established con-
tact with decided to take part and no participants with-
drew consent. One interview had to be cancelled due to
scheduling difficulties. The study was approved by the
Ethical Review Board in Stockholm (Dnr 2011/114-31).
Interviews
The interviews were conducted in Swedish and were
based on nine main open-ended questions (see
Additional file 1), with the possibility of qualifying
follow-up questions depending on the course of the
interview. The focus of the interviews was conceptions
of patient decision-making capacity, its relationship to
psychiatric disorders, and reasoning and experiences
concerning decisions about involuntary treatment. The
participants were encouraged to use anonymised cases
from their own clinical experience to elaborate on the
questions. The interviews lasted about 1–1.5 h and were
recorded with a digital voice recorder and transcribed
verbatim. The number of interviews was not predeter-
mined. Since the interviews were rich in data, we de-
cided that our exploratory aim was achieved after eight
interviews. The results concerning decision-making cap-
acity are presented in a separate paper [42].
Data analysis
The eight interviews were analysed using descriptive
qualitative content analysis following Sandelowski [43].
The analysis was done inductively, without pre-set cat-
egories. Initially the text was read repeatedly to get an
overall impression of the content. Next, meaning units,
phrases expressing thoughts relating to the overall re-
search questions, were identified in the text. Meaning
units expressing the same idea were then sorted together
in sub-categories that were organised into categories
[43–45]. The categories about involuntary treatment
were organised into two sections. The first section,
covering reasoning regarding compulsory treatment, de-
scribes arguments for and against involuntary psychiatric
treatment presented by the respondents in relation to
cases. The second section of categories concerns the cir-
cumstances in which decisions about involuntary psychi-
atric treatment are made.
Results
The pros and cons of ordering involuntary treatment
In the first section, the respondents' reasoning regarding
the pros and cons of ordering involuntary treatment are
presented (Table 1).
Fulfilling the patients’ need of care
The most important reason stated for ordering involun-
tary treatment was the patients’ perceived need of care
and treatment. Firstly, this was seen as necessary in
cases where patients refused care and there was a risk of
suicide. Secondly, involuntary treatment was seen as jus-
tified in cases where seriously ill patients refused treatment
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that was seen as essential for improving their condition,
both psychiatric and somatic. Thirdly, also protection from
social harms was seen as a viable reason for involuntary
treatment.
Preventing suicide Risk of suicide was generally raised
as a major factor when deciding about compulsory
treatment. One of the respondents recalled a case where
a patient with a complicated background, but no estab-
lished psychiatric diagnosis, had issued a suicide threat
in a letter to his counsellor. When they met, the patient
was calm and did not display any severe psychiatric
symptoms.
And this was one of the hardest cases. Because here is a
person who at first sight seems just like anyone else. But
who I know has this background and had expressed
suicidal thoughts in this letter. […] After much hesitation
I made the decision about involuntary admission after
all. It was hard, but with this suicide business…
-Specialist in psychiatry, female.
Another respondent told of a case in which he had
respected a patient’s rejection of medical treatment for a
depression. When asked what could have changed his
mind so that he instead would have decided to admit
the patient involuntarily, he replied:
If she had planned a suicide attempt later the same
week, then I couldn’t have waited.
-Resident in psychiatry, male.
Providing necessary psychiatric treatment The other
typical example of involuntary treatment being consid-
ered justified was when patients rejected a treatment deemed
necessary. The typical example concerned patients with
psychotic disorders.
There are many people whose apartments may be in
total disarray and everything is messed up, but whom
you do not see as mentally disordered. But if you have a
chronically psychotic patient in that situation, then it is
a sign that things are pretty serious. He cannot manage
his everyday life anymore, and that is a sign that he
needs care.
-Specialist in psychiatry, male.
One respondent argued that it is sometimes necessary
to give treatment involuntarily in order to show the
Table 1 Themes, categories, and subcategories extracted from the interviews
Theme Category Subcategory
The pros and cons of ordering involuntary treatment Fulfilling the patients’ need of care Preventing suicide
Providing necessary psychiatric treatment
Ensuring treatment of somatic disorders
Protecting the patient from social harms
Promoting autonomy Restoring autonomous ability
Promoting well-reasoned decisions
Respecting the patient’s presumed will
Safeguarding third party interests Preventing harm to others
Relieving relatives of responsibility
Reasons against involuntary
treatment
Involuntary treatment as an unwanted
exception
Avoiding disruption of trust
Avoiding direct harms of coercion
Respecting self-determination within limits
Circumstances affecting decisions about involuntary
treatment
The patient’s social circumstances Accepting the possibility of rational suicides
Legal influence Legal demands
Interpreting the law
The possibility of informal coercion Restricting options
Using the law to make the patient accept
"voluntary" treatment
Healthcare deficiencies Inadequate care environment
Inadequate resources
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patients that their condition can improve through medica-
tion.
And you see that you have to medicate, at least in
order to show that you can stop this. That, at least, you
make some effort so that the person will not lose their
entire life.
-Specialist in psychiatry, female.
Ensuring treatment of somatic disorders One more
reason mentioned was need of care for somatic condi-
tions. Here it was argued that patients with psychiatric
disorders who mismanaged their somatic disorder could
be involuntarily admitted to treat their somatic disorders.
Then, if he [the patient] has a serious psychiatric
disorder and doesn’t understand the seriousness of his
somatic condition, I think that you have the right to
breach his autonomy.
-Specialist in psychiatry, male.
This, however, was seen as controversial and, in line
with the law, typically only seen as justifiable in severe
cases.
But, I also realise that… well… that you are on thin
ice, and well exactly… Where should you draw the line?
Should you, like, be able to treat high blood pressure
coercively? And that is something I perhaps wouldn’t
consider right.
-Resident in psychiatry, female.
Protecting patients from social harms Another ex-
ample mentioned in the interviews was to protect pa-
tients with acute psychiatric disorders from social harms,
such as ruined relationships or financial problems. The
typical case concerned patients in manic episodes.
Absolutely, in a manic episode… Yes, yes. To protect them
from themselves. […] I don’t find that very complicated
because they can ruin so much for themselves and those
who are close to them.
-Resident in psychiatry, female.
Promoting autonomy
Another category of reasons for accepting involuntary
treatment was that of promoting the patient’s autonomy.
Instances concern restoring the patient’s autonomous abil-
ity, promoting well-founded decisions, and acting in ac-
cordance with what was presumed as the patient’s true will.
Restoring autonomous ability Paradoxical as it may
seem, autonomy was mentioned as a possible justifica-
tion for compulsory treatment. The issue was raised in
various circumstances, the main reason being treatment
of psychotic episodes that were seen as detrimental to
autonomy.
…well, you could really argue that sometimes when
you make decisions about involuntary treatment, at the
end of the day it’s about restoring the patient’s autonomy.
-Specialist in psychiatry, male.
More specifically, improving decision-making capacity
was mentioned:
But the solution is then to treat the psychiatric disorder
so that they are able to understand what their best
interest is. Or to optimise their decision-making capacity
so that they can make a decision.
-Resident in psychiatry, female.
Promoting well-reasoned decisions Issues relating to
autonomy were also mentioned in relation to preventing
patients from impulsive actions that might be detrimen-
tal to reasoned long-term goals.
It could be about giving time. For an important decision,
like a suicide or so, so that you can make that decision
after more reasoning.
-Resident in psychiatry, male.
Respecting the patient’s presumed will Several respon-
dents brought up the idea that consent to treatment
may be presumed despite the patient’s refusal. One idea
was that even though a patient might reject treatment,
this rejection would not be representative of the patient’s
‘true’ will, i.e. what the patient would prefer if not afflicted.
It could be anything from a patient with psychosis who
has a completely different apprehension of the world and
does not, at the moment, want medicine. However, I
know that when he is better, he will want it, because he
wants to be well and get out of this.
-Specialist in psychiatry, female.
One respondent expressed this in terms of what the
patient would want, if they possessed adequate cognitive
abilities.
No, I act in accordance with what I believe [the patient]
would want if he had the time and the intellectual and
emotional ability to reflect on his situation. Presumed
consent.
-Specialist in psychiatry, male.
Safeguarding third party interests
A third category of reasons was reasons relating to
third-party interests. This included both preventing
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danger to others (beside the patient) and relieving rela-
tives of responsibility.
Preventing harm to others One aspect raised by some
respondents was danger of harm to others, which was con-
sidered a major reason for decisions in favour of involuntary
treatment. The examples given all referred to patients with
psychotic symptoms. One respondent talked about a psych-
otic patient who had tried to set fire to her apartment.
She doesn’t let healthcare personnel in and she doesn’t
let social workers in. And maybe she needs another place
to live according to me – in order to minimise the risk of
relapse into this kind of serious criminality and danger
to others.
-Specialist in psychiatry, female.
Relieving relatives of responsibility One respondent
mentioned the interests of patients’ relatives as a rele-
vant factor regarding decisions about compulsory treat-
ment. He argued that relatives should not be left with
the responsibility of caring for seriously ill or suicidal
patients, since they would lay so much blame on them-
selves if the patient were to harm him- or herself.
If you are that worried about a patient. And think that
she is, is suicidal or…psychotic so that she doesn’t know
what she’s doing. Then… then it would not be ethically
justifiable to impose that [responsibility] on the relatives.
-Resident in psychiatry, male.
Reasons against involuntary treatment
A number of situations were described where one or
more of the above mentioned reasons for ordering invol-
untary treatment were present, but where contra reasons
could still make the psychiatrist refrain from deciding in
favour of involuntary admission.
Involuntary treatment as an unwanted exception One
general assertion was that involuntary treatment was
problematic and constituted an unwanted exception to
standard care.
Treatment against the will of the patient…I mean that
should be seen as a real exception.
-Resident in psychiatry, male.
Avoiding disruption of trust The main reason against
compulsory treatment mentioned was typically the risk of
the patient–physician alliance being harmed and patients
losing confidence in the psychiatric services if a decision
about compulsory treatment were to be made. This was
stated as a reason for not ordering involuntary treatment,
also in situations where legal criteria would be fulfilled.
…in the long run there will be a better alliance, she
will maintain her trust in psychiatric care, which is the
only institution in society that [will be able to] help her if
she has a serious mood disorder.
-Resident in psychiatry, male.
Avoiding direct harms of coercion The reasons against
compulsory treatment were often described in terms of
harms or negative outcomes of the treatment. The harm
could be directly related to limiting patient’s freedom or
to the physical coercion that it may involve.
I wouldn’t say that the problem with mandatory treatment
is something abstract. It is that it can be so brutal.
-Specialist in psychiatry, male.
Infringements of patients’ freedom were seen as a dir-
ect harm to be avoided if possible.
It can really be traumatic for someone to be admitted…
24 h… in a [psychiatric] ward when they don’t want to be.
-Specialist in psychiatry, female.
Respecting self-determination within limits As noted,
autonomy was used as a reason for involuntary admittance
and treatment. However, in discussions about involuntary
treatment, respect for self-determination was also men-
tioned as a reason for not ordering involuntary treatment
when patients refused care. Respect for self-determination
was typically the default position in cases where the imme-
diate risk of harm was seen as low. One respondent told
about a case of a patient with bipolar disorder who, after a
manic episode, refused treatment with Lithium.
And that is so frustrating because you know that he
would probably do so much better, but he refuses. And so
we talked about it a lot and […] He had his reasons for
this. And who am I to know better than him?
-Resident in psychiatry, female
However, it was acknowledged, if the condition were
to deteriorate, (involuntary) treatment would still be an
option. Another respondent told of a case where she had
been consulted as an expert by the court. The patient
was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and was deemed to
be in a manic state, however the respondent did not
agree with the assessment of the attending psychiatrist.
Then it was better [for the patient] to make these
decisions himself, so that he could take the consequences,
not blame it on us for locking him up and stopping him… I
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think he needed to feel that he could take responsibility
himself.
- Specialist in psychiatry, female.
Accepting the possibility of rational suicides As
already noted, suicide prevention was mentioned as a
major reason for involuntary psychiatric treatment. How-
ever, it was also argued that not all possible cases of sui-
cide should be seen as cases for psychiatric care. When
asked directly, respondents agreed that so-called ‘rational
suicides’ might occur although there were different asser-
tions regarding how common they are. Such suicides were
often described as a means of escaping somatic conditions.
I think that it could be about somatic conditions.
Where you may be suffering, you are in terrible pain; you
see that your level of functioning is deteriorating. And
you don’t have any other way out.
-Specialist in psychiatry, female
However, it was also argued that psychiatrists should
be cautious.
I think that if as a psychiatrist or physician you are to
judge whether there are rational reasons, you are into
something that is pretty dangerous and hard to tell for
any outside person.
-Specialist in psychiatry, male.
One respondent specifically asserted the right of psy-
chiatric patients to make decisions about when and how
to end their lives. The respondent raised this argument
in relation to a case where a patient with a psychiatric
disorder and a debilitating and painful physical condition
had contemplated going abroad in order to complete a
physician-assisted suicide.
And in these discussions, people have hesitated whether
to allow patients with serious psychiatric disorders to
make decisions about this. And I do not think that
should be a hindrance, it should rather be a right.
-Specialist in psychiatry, female.
Circumstances affecting decisions about involuntary
treatment
The second section of categories concerns the circum-
stances in which decisions about compulsory psychiatric
treatment are made.
The patient’s social circumstances
It was argued that the patient’s social circumstances, e.g. so-
cial network and economical situation, also could influence
whether an involuntary admission was deemed necessary.
For instance, I do believe that it [involuntary
admission] is more common among people who do not
have that much resources and…relatives that take
care of them….
-Resident in psychiatry, male.
Legal influence
The relationship between ethics and the law was de-
scribed in two ways. The law set a basic framework for
the ethical deliberations and was often commended by
the respondents; however, it was also seen as something
open to interpretations by the psychiatrists.
Legal demands Several respondents acknowledged that
the law heavily influenced their ethical deliberations.
Mostly, the law was seen as commendable, but some of
the respondents were also critical of ethical issues often
being treated as mere legal issues.
It becomes so easy to conflate ethics and the law. When
you work so much with it. You get used to … to think
according to the law.
-Resident in psychiatry, male.
Interpreting the law However, respondents also ac-
knowledged that the law in itself was not very clear and
that in most situations it left room for personal judg-
ments and choices between different alternatives.
Like I said before: first you think about it ethically:
should you try to save her? And if you decide that you
will try, then you will have to use the law the way you
can.
-Resident in psychiatry, male.
Another respondent argued similarly that whether or not
it was possible to admit a patient involuntarily depended
on how the physician chose to present the patient’s symp-
toms in the involuntary treatment order. In the case dis-
cussed by the respondent, the respondent believed that
there was a risk of the patient harming herself if she were
not admitted. The patient, however, did not accept to stay
at the ward.
And I think that the first criterion is not really satisfied.
That there is a serious psychiatric disorder. […] But,
anyway I chose to order involuntary treatment. I was
thinking that I would be able to get the criterion fulfilled
anyway.
-Resident in psychiatry, male.
The possibility of informal coercion
In some cases the patient refused or was reluctant to accept
care, but a formal decision about involuntary treatment was
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deemed inappropriate or not possible. Here, there was a
‘grey zone’ between persuasion and manipulation that could
be used to make the patient accept treatment and this func-
tioned as an alternative to formal coercion.
Restricting options One respondent argued that, par-
ticularly in somatic care, one way to achieve this was to
restrict information about alternatives.
You don’t create that many alternatives for the patient.
[You say] ‘This is…we have to give you this.’ You behave
in a way that does not give the patient any alternatives.
-Specialist in psychiatry, male.
Using the law to make the patient accept “voluntary”
treatment Another way to make the patient comply was
to merely introduce the possibility of coercive treatment.
One respondent gave an example of how this might be
carried out:
Maybe you can put it this way: I have… I am worried
about you, and so I am considering whether to order
involuntary treatment if you do not agree to be admitted
voluntarily.
-Specialist in psychiatry, female.
Healthcare deficiencies
The functioning of health care also influences decision-
making regarding involuntary treatment according to
the respondents. Here it was argued that decisions about
compulsory treatment were made that could have been
avoided in a more well-functioning healthcare organisation.
Inadequate care environment It was argued that the
atmosphere in the clinical ward affected how patients
behaved and how they were treated. This included fea-
tures such as presence of other distressed patients, atti-
tude and behaviour of the staff and whether or not
patients knew the staff from before.
I think that just coming in to a psychiatric emergency
ward creates a number of incentives for coercive measures
that would not exist in a calmer and friendlier atmosphere,
where the patients know the staff.
-Specialist in psychiatry, male.
It was also argued that the need for coercive interven-
tions varied from one ward to another, depending on the
staff and their approach to the patients.
For instance, the amount of coercive measures varies,
depending on what nurse works there. And that depends
on…how you treat the patients.
-Resident in psychiatry, male.
Inadequate resources When physicians were not able
to give patients appointments for return visits, coercive
measures were deemed more likely.
And then it feels like you are using mandatory treatment
in order to… make sure the patient gets appropriate
follow-up.
-Resident in psychiatry, male.
Discussion
In line with the Swedish legislation, the respondents typ-
ically saw involuntary treatment as justifiable in cases
where the patient had a serious psychiatric disorder and
rejected treatment, or where there was a direct risk of
self-harm. A commonly mentioned reason against com-
pulsory treatment was the risk of disrupting the doctor-
patient relationship and ruining trust in the psychiatric
services. In this way, much of the reasoning was based
on assumptions and deliberations about consequences,
where the physician would aim to make the decision he
or she believed benefitted the patient the most short
term as well as long term. However, there was a general
feeling conveyed in the interviews that involuntary treat-
ment was problematic in itself and something to be
avoided. This notion was often implicit in the reasoning
and rarely expressed in so many words.
Suicide and self-determination
When it came to the actual cases described, suicidality
was possibly the most important reason mentioned for
justifying compulsory treatment. However, the respon-
dents generally agreed that suicides may be rational and
not necessarily a consequences of psychiatric disorders,
but they disagreed about how common such suicides
are. One argued that such cases, albeit theoretically pos-
sible, were not clinically relevant, while another respond-
ent claimed to encounter such patients on a regular
basis when working as a liaison psychiatrist at a general
hospital. The commonly quoted example of what would be a
‘rational suicide’ focused on cases involving somatic disor-
ders or persons at the end of life who were suffering greatly
and to whom no relief was available. Thus, the rationality of
suicides were primarily discussed in terms of when circum-
stances and consequences would make it rational for per-
sons to end their lives, not in terms of autonomy or
decision-making capacity [46].
One of the respondents stated that patients should
have a right to end their lives, including a right to assisted
suicide, and that this right should also include patients
suffering from psychiatric disorders. Another respondent
argued that even though rational suicides exist, psychia-
trists should remain cautious about the concept and
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refrain from declaring any particular instance of suicide,
or suicidal ideation, as rational. Thus, although these
respondents shared basic factual assumptions about the
existence of rational suicides, their statements highlight a
normative difference on how healthcare should handle
such cases.
Autonomy considerations
Issues relating to patient autonomy were used as a rea-
son both for and against involuntary treatment. Restor-
ation of autonomy in non-autonomous patients was held
forth as a goal for treatment, most notably in cases of
psychosis. Respect for personal decisions was held to be
a reason against compulsory treatment, mainly in cases
of somatic disorders. In general, concerns for patient
autonomy focused more on the idea of autonomy as a
value to be promoted or restored than as a right to have
one’s decisions respected [3]. It was often presumed that
patients in need of compulsory treatment were also deci-
sionally incapable [42]. However, lack of decision-making
capacity was not broached as an important criterion for
when compulsory treatment was justified. Thus, it may be
argued that the main ethical principles underlying the re-
spondents’ reasoning are promotion of good (or benefi-
cence) and prevention of harm, rather than respect for
autonomy. This is also in line with the findings of Feiring
and Ugstad [36].
One interesting line of thought presented by some re-
spondents is the idea of treatment being something that
the patient would hypothetically or ideally consent to. In
a recent study of psychiatric inpatients, most patients
who regained capacity following treatment retrospect-
ively approved of the treatment decisions made on their
behalf when decisionally incapable [47]. Thus, it may be
argued that even though the patient under current cir-
cumstances rejects treatment, the patient’s ‘true’ (i.e.
mentally healthy or decisionally capable) self would con-
sent to it. This idea relates to an ongoing discussion
about the role of authenticity in personal autonomy. It
has, in bioethical debate, been argued that healthcare
staff may justifiably overrule decisions that are insuffi-
ciently authentic in order to protect a patient’s authentic
or underlying true interests [3, 48]. In cases where a pa-
tient is incapable of making a decision, it may be a useful
strategy to try to identify the option that best fits with
the patient’s ideals and wishes when decisionally capable.
However, it is quite another thing to argue that an other-
wise competent patient is insufficiently autonomous be-
cause of lack of authenticity. As argued elsewhere, the
concept of authenticity seems notoriously hard to define
in a way that is both normatively reasonable and applic-
able in a clinical setting [48]. One problem is that it
could more or less always be argued that a patient would
have made another decision, if just circumstances were
different, or if they had not been ill. However, if any
seemingly imprudent decision could be labelled as in-
authentic and therefore invalid, the principle of respect for
autonomy would lack normative force [2, 48].
Law and ethics
Sometimes a conflict was described between what the
physicians believe is right and the legal demands. It was,
however, commonly argued that there is room for differ-
ent interpretations of the law, and that individual doc-
tors’ judgments played an important role for when and
why decisions about involuntary treatment were made.
Moreover, several respondents told of situations when
the borders between voluntary and involuntary treat-
ment were blurred. Some acknowledged that manipula-
tion could be justifiable if treatment was deemed in the
patient’s best interest and compulsory treatment was not
a viable option. This reveals an ambiguity: on the one
hand it was obvious that the respondents’ own ethical
reasoning was closely aligned with the Swedish law, but
on the other hand it was generally acknowledged that
the law left room for interpretation and personal judg-
ment. With this, the law was sometimes used to make
patients accept treatment voluntarily, using an implicit
threat of involuntary treatment if the patient would not
comply. Possible reasons for this may be that involuntary
psychiatric admission is perceived as more stigmatising
than a voluntary admission, or that the law may not be
applicable in all circumstances. However, even though
the physicians may experience such implicit coercion as
less a violation of a patient’s freedom than a formal deci-
sion about involuntary admission, it may be just as prob-
lematic from the point of view of autonomy, or even
more so, since the patient is not fully informed about
the conditions underlying their admission.
Institutional factors
Many respondents brought up organisational factors as
important for when and how decisions about compul-
sory care were made. These factors are interesting since
they constitute the framework in which the decisions are
made, and in many respects they lie outside the physi-
cians’ direct control.
Patients' lack of social support was assumed to
increase the likelihood of a decision about involuntary
treatment being made. One factor that was not men-
tioned in the interviews but raised in the study by
Feiring and Ugstad was presence of children in the pa-
tient’s home. This was mentioned as a reason for invol-
untary treatment in the Norwegian study [36], and it is
also in line with the personal experiences of the authors
of this paper that this may play a role for involuntary
treatment decisions also in Swedish psychiatric care.
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It is noteworthy that several respondents argued that
inadequate healthcare organisation and care environ-
ment could make decisions about involuntary treatment
necessary. Thus, it was claimed that there might be situ-
ations where circumstances compel the conscientious phys-
ician to make a decision leading to involuntary treatment
when this could have been avoided in a better care environ-
ment and in organisations with better follow-up routines.
As argued elsewhere, issues regarding healthcare organisa-
tion and interpersonal treatment are in many cases inter-
twined [49].
If involuntary treatment is used as a means to cover
up deficiencies in standard psychiatric care, the issue of
how to improve standard care needs to be raised. Organ-
isational deficiencies can be addressed both at the level
of individual hospital organisations and in the broader
political context. The issue of how bad interpersonal
treatment affects patients may be addressed within the
individual healthcare organisation, as well as in profes-
sional training. Further studies regarding this would be
valuable.
Limitations
The number of respondents in this study is relatively
small and the topics complex, hence it is possible that
more interviews would gain further and more nuanced
data. However, the obtained data was rich and nuanced,
and the last two interviews mainly confirmed findings
from the other six interviews, which suggests that our
decision to stop at eight interviews was not premature.
It is also interesting to point out the similarities be-
tween our findings and those in the previously cited
study by Feiring and Ugstad [36].
One issue to bear in mind is the character of the issues
discussed: questions about the use of coercion, clinical
decision making and judgment are sensitive and respon-
dents may adjust their answers to accord with what they
perceive as ethically or legally correct. It is also import-
ant to note that the qualitative design does not allow for
hypothesis testing at a generalised level. Thus, it is not
possible to say whether the experiences and viewpoints
of the interviewed psychiatrists are representative for
Swedish psychiatrists in general.
Conclusions
In the interviews, ethical deliberations about compulsory
treatment were discussed in relation to issues about
autonomy and patients’ decision-making capacity. The
respondents’ judgments about involuntary treatment
were typically in line with Swedish law on the subject.
However, it was also argued that the law leaves room
for individual judgments when making decisions
about involuntary treatment and that informal coercion
sometimes would be used as an alternative to a formal
decision about involuntary treatment. Much of the rea-
soning focused on the consequences of ordering invol-
untary treatment, where risk of harm to the therapeutic
alliance was weighed against the assumed good conse-
quences of ensuring that patients received needed care.
Cases concerning suicidal patients and psychotic patients
who did not realise their need for care were typically held
as paradigmatic examples of justified involuntary treat-
ment. However, there was an ambivalence regarding the
issue of suicide prevention as it was also argued that the
risk of suicide in itself was not sufficient for justified invol-
untary care, because of the possibility of rational suicides.
Yet some respondents claimed that this possibility is not
clinically relevant and should be disregarded in actual
practice. Respect for autonomy was rarely directly invoked
in terms of a right for patients to refuse treatment. How-
ever, autonomy was sometimes held as a reason for invol-
untary treatment in order to promote autonomy or
facilitate autonomous decision-making. The respondents
also raised issues related to healthcare organisation and
the care environment, and it was argued that some
decisions about compulsory treatment could have
been avoided, given a more patient-oriented healthcare
organisation.
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